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The paper argues firstly that, since there is no obvious separatist movement within 
Zakarpattya, the Ukrainian state should seek as far as possible to accommodate Hungarian 
identity claims within the region (and those of other smaller minority communities living 
within the state) as part of a normative  and instrumental strategy of promoting ‘unity in 
diversity’ . Secondly, it argues that Ukraine’s current concept of decentralization offers 
space to realise the non-territorial vision of cultural autonomy, provided that sufficient 
attention is also given to maintaining pre-existing territorially-based provisions with 
regard to minority language use and political representation for Hungarians at both 
regional and national level.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a new government was formed in Ukraine 
following the February 2014 Euromaidan 
Revolution, it quickly declared administrative-
territorial reform to be one of its key priorities 
within a general programme of democratisation 
and closer association with the European Union 
(EU). After more than two decades of largely  
 
 
unsuccessful attempts to do away with the highly 
centralized state mechanism inherited from the 
USSR and enable more effective decision-making 
and initiative on a local level, a Concept on Local 
Governance and Reform of Territorial 
Organization was promptly adopted in April 2014. 
On the basis of this concept, processes of 
administrative decentralisation have begun to take 
shape over the past two years, despite the 
Ukrainian government’s de facto loss of control 
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over Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the 
eastern Donbas region sustained by the Kremlin’s 
sponsorship and intervention on behalf of Donetsk 
and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’.  
  The 2014 Revolution and subsequent 
crisis have also brought into focus other issues 
related to consolidation of political community in 
Ukraine, not least the need to better accommodate 
‘various ethnic, linguistic, religious and socio-
economic identities and cleavages’ that have 
persisted since Ukraine became independent since 
1991.2 Political manipulation of these identities 
(external, but also internal during the rule of 
President Yanukovich and his predecessors) has 
encouraged an outside perception of conflict 
between a ‘Ukrainian West’ and ‘Russian East’ 
that occludes a far more complex picture of 
regional diversity. Among other things, the 
predominant focus on the relative positions of 
Ukrainian and Russian language and culture 
within debates on nation-building has drawn 
attention away from issues relating to a wide range 
of smaller ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic 
minority communities living within the state.   
  In keeping with its goal of closer 
association with the European Union, the post-
Maidan Ukrainian government adopted the EU 
motto of ‘Unity in Diversity’ as a guiding 
principle for consolidation of the political 
community. This implied adherence to the 
minority rights norms propounded by the Union 
and it cognate organisations in this area, the 
Council of Europe and OSCE. Broadly speaking, 
these seek to ensure that persons belonging to 
ethno-cultural minorities within member states 
should enjoy full rights as citizens – including 
possibilities to participate meaningfully in public 
life - while simultaneously preserving their 
distinct identities. 
 The norms and arrangements embodied by this 
minority rights ‘regime’, however, remain 
necessarily vague and contested, and the overall 
readiness of individual states to accommodate 
minority claims contingent upon domestic 
political factors as well as the geostrategic 
environment in which the state finds itself at a 
given time.3 In this regard, one can hardly 
underestimate the challenges of implementing 
diversity policies within present-day Ukraine. 
With Russia controlling parts of the east and south 
of the country, and overall issues of constitutional 
reform still linked to implementation of the stalled 
Minsk II agreement, reform proposals in this area 
are inevitably assessed not on basis of their own 
legal merits, but in terms of their possible 
implications for security, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. This remains the case even 
where such proposals are presented in terms of 
decentralisation and cultural rights rather than the 
far more contentious discourse (promoted by 
Russia) of federalisation.4    
  Leaving aside the more obvious ‘hot 
spots’ of Crimea and Donbas, ethnic, linguistic 
and regional cleavages have since 2014 also 
acquired a particular sensitivity in Ukraine’s 
westernmost region of Zakarpattya. Here, leaders 
of the small but compact and politically mobilised 
Hungarian community living contiguously to the 
border with Hungary have found themselves at 
odds with the regional and national government 
over a renewal of claims (first articulated back in 
1991 during the dissolution of the USSR and 
transition to Ukrainian independence) for an 
autonomous Hungarian district. The present paper 
discusses the specifics of this case, using it to 
reflect more broadly on the relationship between 
territorial-administrative decentralisation and 
ethno-cultural diversity in Ukraine, and to 
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consider how some of the issues and challenges 
that have come to light might best be addressed 
going forward.  
  The paper argues firstly that, since there is 
no obvious separatist movement within 
Zakarpattya, the Ukrainian state should seek as far 
as possible to accommodate Hungarian identity 
claims within the region (and, indeed, those of 
other smaller minority communities living within 
the state) as part of a normative and instrumental 
strategy of promoting ‘unity in diversity’.5 The 
specific Hungarian claim can also be seen as 
consistent with Article 6 of Ukraine’s existing 
1992 Law on National Minorities, which refers to 
the right of ‘national-cultural autonomy’ (hereafter 
NCA). To date, however, this law has remained 
largely declaratory, and there is therefore no single 
accepted definition of the NCA concept within a 
Ukrainian context. Discussions are now underway 
as to how to give this concept more concrete 
legislative shape. Our paper suggests that the 
current Hungarian minority proposal for national-
territorial autonomy – aside from being politically 
contentious – is impractical and also potentially 
problematic in terms of promoting fuller 
integration of the region into the framework of the 
Ukrainian state. Instead, we argue, the NCA issue 
is best approached through a non-territorial 
strategy that avoids any explicit institutional 
linkage between ethnicity and territory. Non-
territorial autonomy is a concept that lacks any 
single clear definition and denotes a ‘multiplicity 
of organisational forms’.6 Broadly speaking, 
however, it denotes a system whereby ethno-
cultural minorities organise themselves as 
communities of persons and establish institutions 
that enable them to autonomously handle issues 
relevant to preservation of their particular identity 
within a territorial space shared by different ethnic 
communities. It is highlighted as one possible 
approach to reconciling the ‘recurrent tension’ that 
exists within international law between the right to 
self-determination of peoples (first enunciated in 
the aftermath of World War One) and the 
territorial integrity of existing states, as well as the 
associated question (still central to current debates 
on the ‘European Minority Rights Regime’) of 
whether cultural rights and rights of self-
determination should be attached to communities 
at all, or should rather apply only to individuals.7  
 Our paper argues that – on paper, at least – 
Ukraine’s current concept of decentralization 
offers space to realise this non-territorial vision of 
cultural autonomy, provided that sufficient 
attention is also given to maintaining pre-existing 
territorially-based provisions with regard to 
minority language use and political representation 
for Hungarians at both regional and national level. 
Institutional blueprints are of course one thing, 
securing the political conditions for their 
realisation quite another. In this regard, our 
analysis suggests that prospects for such a reform 
are undermined not only by the current 
geostrategic context (and attendant concerns about 
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity), but 
also by a weakly developed culture of deliberative 
democracy and a continued tendency by ruling 
elites to instrumentalise ethnic identities and 
cleavages in an effort to block reform and preserve 
their own personal interests and authority.8 As 
regards the deliberative dimension, at least, recent 
literature as well as practical experience elsewhere 
suggest that NCA institutions can also play a 
positive role in terms of building inter-ethnic trust 
and giving ‘voice’ to minorities within the wider 
policymaking process, by functioning as 
interlocutors with state and local authorities within 
consultative bodies.9 Ukraine already has some 
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experience of such frameworks, as seen most 
notably in the example of the Crimean Tatar 
Qurultay/Mejlis. NTA arrangements found in 
other post-communist states such as Serbia might 
also be instructive when looking at the current 
situation in Ukraine.10 
 
II. UKRAINE’S TERRITORIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM  
The Concept on Local Governance and Reform of 
Territorial Organization adopted by Ukraine in 
April 2014 set the tasks of defining a well-founded 
territorial basis for the activity of local self-
governments in the country and of establishing 
appropriate material, financial and organizational 
conditions for execution of their responsibilities. 
The Concept provides for the continued existence 
of 27 large administrative-territorial regions11, but 
aims to amalgamate 31,000 pre-existing villages 
and townships into larger ‘capable territorial 
communities’ (hromady – 1500-1800 in total to be 
created). Districts (raiony) are to be retained as 
intermediate-level structures between hromady 
and regions, but the number of these is to be 
reduced from the current 490 to between 120 and 
150. It is envisaged that this will be achieved in 
the first instance through a process of voluntary 
unification led by the villages and townships 
themselves, though in consultation with the 
authorities of the relevant region, which draw up 
and approve overall ‘perspective plans’ for 
submission and final approval by central 
government.  
  Although 25 of Ukraine’s regions have 
already submitted perspective plans at the time of 
writing12, various problems have arisen: some of 
the new territorial communities proposed at local 
level have been deemed not to possess the material 
and budgetary capacities necessary to ensure self-
sufficiency; in some cases individual villages and 
towns have also sought to delay or abstain from 
unification,13 while in others regional councils 
have attempted to block perspective plans 
elaborated by their administrations. In light of 
these issues, further legislation designed to speed 
up the formation of capable communities was 
proposed in December 2015.14  
 Also, while the decentralisation process refers to 
the need to take into account ‘historic, natural, 
ethnic and cultural factors influencing the socio-
economic development of the united territorial 
community’,15 the focus of current reforms has 
been on ensuring economic viability and capacity 
of new units, rather than on issues of diversity 
accommodation.16 The implication here seems to 
be that if the new territorial communities 
envisaged under the reform are recognized as 
economically capable, they will be able to 
accommodate the needs of national minorities 
living within them. This view has been contested 
in Ukraine’s westernmost region of Zakarpattya – 
the only one currently under the remit of the 
Ukrainian government that has yet to have its 
perspective plan approved – where the reform 
process has seen a recent revival of calls to 
establish a ‘national district (raion)’ catering 
specifically for the Hungarian-speaking minority 
that lives mostly compactly in the westernmost 
districts of Zakarpattya lying adjacent to the 
border with Hungary. The rejection of this 
proposal by the regional authorities has resulted in 
an impasse: at the time of writing, existing local 
authorities in the Hungarian area of settlement 
have yet to engage with the 2014 Concept on 
Local Governance.  
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III. HUNGARIAN MINORITY 
CLAIMS IN ZAKARPATTYA  
Zakarpattya is one of the most ethnically diverse 
regions in Ukraine. According to the last all-
Ukraine census, Hungarians constitute the second 
largest ethnicity (12.1% of the population) after 
Ukrainians, followed by Romanians (2.6%), 
Russians (2.5%), Roma (1.1%), Slovaks (0.5%) 
and Germans (0.3%).17 For the most part 
compactly settled in areas adjacent to the border 
with Hungary (see Figure 1), the Hungarian 
minority has retained a strong sense of identity. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Hungarian-speakers in Zakarpattya Oblast (State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine) 
 
Institutional support for Hungarian language and 
culture, including in the form of educational 
provision has been carried over into independent 
Ukraine. However, the nature of the Soviet system 
meant that pupils receiving education in 
Hungarian learned Russian (the lingua franca of  
 
the USSR as a whole) as a second language, rather 
than Ukrainian. Today, levels of Ukrainian 
language proficiency among graduates from 
schools with Hungarian language instruction 
remain low.18 In what is otherwise a mainly 
Ukrainian-speaking region, this can be seen as an 
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issue to be addressed in terms of segregation of 
public life and integration of the local population 
into the framework of an independent Ukraine. 
   Today, the Hungarian minority is 
represented by two political parties: The 
Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine (add 
full name in Hungarian - hereafter UMDSZ) and 
The Community of Hungarian Culture of 
Zakarpattya (add full name in Hungarian - 
hereafter KMKSZ).19 Previously rivals for the 
ethnic Hungarian vote, the two parties signed a 
cooperation agreement in September 2015 ahead 
of elections to the Zakarpattya regional council.20 
On this basis they were able to significantly boost 
the representation of Hungarians at regional level, 
obtaining 12.5% of the vote and 8 seats, the 
largest number held by Hungarian deputies since 
2002.   
  During the process leading to dissolution 
of the USSR in late 1991, political mobilization 
amongst Hungarians in Zakarpattya brought calls 
– reflecting pre-existing Soviet approaches of 
ethno-territorial federalism – for the establishment 
of an autonomous Hungarian district within the 
region. In a disputed referendum organized in 
December 1991, 81.4% of voters in the mostly 
Hungarian-populated Berehovo raion expressed 
their support for the proposal, which was 
discussed at the level of the regional council, but 
never submitted for consideration by the 
Ukrainian Parliament.21 Subsequent to this, 
Hungarian minority leaders lobbied unsuccessfully 
for the creation of a single district (to be named 
‘Prytysyanskyi raion’) that would unite territories 
populated by the Hungarian minority within the 
existing Berehovo, Uzhhorod, Mukachevo and 
Vynohradiv districts and in which Hungarians 
would comprise 72% of a total population of 
155,000.22  
 This claim for a Hungarian national district has 
been revived following the Euromaidan 
Revolution, within the context of current debates 
on decentralization. A proposal along these lines 
was put forward in December 2015 at a meeting of 
the NGO ‘Organization of the Borderland Local 
Authorities’. According to Karolina Dorchi, head 
of the KMKSZ faction in the city council of 
Berehovo, 114 villages and towns encompassing 
170.000 residents of Zakarpattya region had 
already declared their willingness to establish such 
an entity, ‘not for the purpose of reaching some 
political goals, but, first and foremost, for ensuring 
stable economic development of this territorial 
community and Zakarpattya in general’.23  
  In response to this idea, a representative of 
the Zakarpattya Regional Office of Reforms24, 
Oleh Luksha, emphasized that since the new 
capable territorial communities envisaged under 
the official reform concept would have the funds 
and authority necessary for developing economic 
cooperation, there was no reason to establish a 
larger unit catering specifically for the needs of 
the Hungarian minority. Moreover, Luksha 
stressed that there is no legislation currently in 
force in Ukraine that would allow for the 
establishment of national raiony within the 
decentralization process.25 This point was later 
reiterated by Hennadiy Moskal, appointed as 
Governor of Zakarpattya in July 2015, who stated 
that ‘Hungarians may meet and discuss all 
possible things, but [the establishment of a 
Hungarian district] does not have a constitutional 
basis’.26 Moskal took this line notwithstanding the 
fact that the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction (PPB) 
which he heads within the Regional Council is 
currently allied with the bloc of Hungarian 
deputies sitting there.27    
  While establishment of autonomous 
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ethno-territorial units was a central pillar of the 
top-down system for management of ethnic 
diversity within the USSR, well-functioning 
examples within democratic states are few and far 
between. Nor are there any clearly-defined 
provisions for the establishment of such units 
within current (albeit vaguely defined) 
international norms on minority rights.28 Ethno-
territorial arrangements implicitly assign 
‘ownership’ of a particular sub-region to a 
particular ethno-cultural group; however, since it 
is seldom if ever possible to make political 
boundaries congruent with ethnic ones, ethno-
territorial autonomy typically leads to the creation 
of ‘new’ minorities within the sub-polity in 
question.29 The language use patterns seen in 
Figure 1 above illustrate this contention very well. 
Furthermore, claims ‘from below’ for ethno-
territorial autonomy within existing unitary states 
are invariably viewed as highly unwelcome by the 
government concerned, which tends to frame them 
as a threat to its sovereignty and – in some 
geostrategic conditions - to the territorial integrity 
of the state as a whole.  
  Current circumstances in Ukraine mean 
that such claims are especially sensitive at the 
present time. In the specific case of Zakarpattya, 
they are exacerbated by an historic legacy of 
territorial contestation and border changes in the 
region during the 20th century, and by the presence 
of activists demanding official recognition for a 
distinct Rusyn or Ruthenian nationality group 
within the local population. The existence of a 
Rusyn national minority has been acknowledged 
in neighbouring countries of the region, but this 
status has hitherto been denied within Ukraine, 
where authorities deem Rusyns to be part of the 
Ukrainian nation, with a distinct regional identity 
and speaking a distinct dialect. While levels of 
mobilisation around this identity are currently low 
in Zarkarpattya, the movement has in the past 
been courted by local politician and businessman 
Viktor Baloha, who previously headed the 
regional administration during the 1990s and 
whose regionally-based United Centre party 
currently holds the largest number of seats in the 
regional council – 19 compared to only 15 for the 
Petro Poroshenko Bloc. The United Centre is one 
of the parties currently blocking the adoption of a 
perspective plan for the region. Any alignment 
between the PPB and Hungarian parties in 
Zakarpattya can therefore be countered with 
threats to revive talk of autonomy for the region as 
a whole, which also formed the object of a 
disputed referendum in late 1991. What makes the 
Rusyn identity claim particularly sensitive is the 
fact that Russia voices support for this, while the 
radical right and pro-Russian Jobbik party in 
neighbouring Hungary also called in March 2014 
for the establishment of ‘Rusyn-Hungarian’ 
autonomy in Zakarpattya, seeing this as a step 
towards incorporation of the region into a Greater 
Hungary.30 Although the Fidesz-led government in 
Budapest condemned such statements, Hungary’s 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s own call soon after 
for Hungarians in Ukraine to be granted dual 
citizenship and territorial autonomy was itself 
arguably less than helpful in terms of making the 
Kyiv government more amenable to 
accommodating Hungarian minority demands.31 
IV. TERRITORIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND 
ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY: 
THE ISSUES  
How credible, then, is the suggestion –   implicit 
in the current Concept on Territorial 
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Administrative Reform - that strengthening local 
self-government through the formation of capable 
territorial communities would in itself provide 
sufficient responsibilities and resources for proper 
execution of national-cultural autonomy? In the 
first instance, the answer to depends upon how the 
boundaries of the proposed new units are drawn 
and how provisions for local use of minority 
languages – currently still based on a 2012 law 
‘On principles of the state language policy’ – are 
developed within the context of the ongoing 
reform process. Ukraine’s current language law 
stipulates that in districts where national 
minorities constitute more than 10% of the 
population, the local authority has the right to 
grant the relevant minority language official status 
alongside Ukrainian. The adoption of this law, 
though officially justified by reference to the 
Council of Europe European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages (ECRML),32 elicited 
controversy both in Ukraine and internationally, 
since it was widely viewed as an attempt by the 
then Yanukovich government to further entrench 
the already strong position of Russian in public 
life at the expense of Ukrainian, rather than being 
motived by any concern for what could more 
properly be considered ‘minority’ languages in 
Ukraine.33 In spite of this, subsequent reporting 
under the ECRML suggests that –at least on paper 
- the law offers many potential benefits to smaller 
linguistic minorities, in so far as the 10% 
threshold rule can be applied right down to the 
level of individual town and village councils.34 If 
due account is indeed to be taken of ‘historic, 
natural, ethnic and cultural factors’ when forming 
new enlarged ‘capable territorial communities’, 
attention clearly needs to be given to how the 
quite generous provisions of this law can best be 
maintained. In the case of minorities - such as the 
Hungarians – with a marked territorial 
concentration, this should not be a major issue, 
though (as Figure 1 suggests) some outlying 
settlements would likely be affected in any 
amalgamation of existing territorial units.   
  A second issue to be worked through in 
any reform relates to ensuring equitable political 
representation for ethnic Hungarians at both the 
regional and the national levels. This question has 
long been a source of friction between Hungarian 
minority leaders and central government, 
especially with respect to Hungarian minority 
representation in the Ukrainian parliament 
(Verkhovna Rada). Under the terms of a law on 
parliamentary elections operational from 1997-
2002, Hungarians benefited from the existence of 
a single electoral district centred on Berehovo, 
with boundaries covering all of the territories 
where ethnic Hungarians live compactly and thus 
corresponding more or less to those of the 
‘Prytysyanskyi raion’ previously proposed during 
the 1990s (see Figure 2).35 Subsequent 
developments, however, have significantly limited 
the possibilities for ethnic Hungarian 
representation. Firstly, legislative amendments 
adopted during 2001-2005 abolished provision for 
minority electoral districts. Despite appeals by 
Hungarian parties to the Central Electoral 
Commission of Ukraine to reinstate the provision 
ahead of the 2012 elections, ethnic Hungarians 
made up less than 50% of the population in all of 
the voting districts established in Zakarpattya in 
April 2012.36 
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Figure 2: Borders of electoral district 72 for the 1998 parliamentary elections in Ukraine  
[From Karpatskyi Objective, 04/12/2013] 
Secondly, changes to the electoral law in 2004-05 
abolished the system of proportional 
representation and set a new threshold rule 
whereby candidates could only be elected if they 
were included in the list of a political party 
gaining more than 3% of the vote.37 With the 
emergence of KMKSZ as a rival to UMDSZ at 
this time also contriving to split the ethnic 
Hungarian vote, the practice began of co-opting 
Hungarian leaders into the lists of all-Ukraine 
political parties. Members of both Hungarian 
parties were given places on such lists but were 
not elected, leading to a situation where 
Hungarians had no representation at all in 
parliament during 2006-2012. This changed in 
2012, when UMDSZ leader István Gajdos was 
elected after the ruling Party of Regions offered 
him a relatively high place (74rd) on its list.38 The 
new situation, however, meant that national 
minorities were now dependent on situational 
agreements with one or other (generally the 
ruling) national-level political party, and no longer 
had any legal safeguards for their representation. 
While a further amendment to the electoral law in 
November 2013 stated that the interests of 
national minorities should be taken into account 
when determining the boundaries of individual 
mandate constituencies, the borders of electoral 
districts have in practice remained unchanged.39 
V. EUROMAIDAN AND BEYOND: A 
NEW CHAPTER  
The Euromaidan Revolution of February 2014 
seemed at first sight to herald a new chapter in 
relations between the Hungarian minority and the 
state. A part of his successful campaign for the 
presidential elections held in May 2014, Petro 
Poroshenko signed an agreement with KMKSZ 
leader Lazslo Brenzovics. Under this, Brenzovics 
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pledged his party’s support for Poroshenko, in 
return for the latter’s commitment to the following 
set of objectives geared to accommodation of the 
Hungarian national minority:40 
 
1. to ensure the language rights of national 
minorities in accordance with the European 
Charter for regional or minority languages;  
2. to secure national minority rights and interests 
at the level of territorial communities within the 
context of the administrative reform;  
3. to contribute to the establishment (though local 
administration bodies) of separate units 
coordinating educational institutions of national 
minorities; 
4. to contribute to the restitution of property which 
was illegally confiscated from religious 
communities during Soviet times; 
5. to ensure representation of ethnic Hungarians in 
the parliament; 
6. to rehabilitate Hungarians who were repressed 
during Soviet times.  
If delivered upon, points 1, 2 and 5 of this 
agreement appear consistent with ensuring that 
existing provisions on local language use are 
maintained within the context of territorial-
administrative reform, while also addressing the 
claims that Hungarian minority spokespersons 
have made in recent years regarding representation 
in parliament. Point 3 is interesting, in so far as it 
suggests the possibility of establishing additional 
institutions catering specifically for the 
educational needs of the Hungarian minority, 
should circumstances arise where these could not 
be met through reformed local authority 
structures. Such an arrangement would seem 
consistent with the broad definition of non-
territorial autonomy set out by Tove Malloy, 
Alexander Osipov and Balasz Vizi in their 2015 
volume Managing Diversity Through Non-
Territorial Autonomy, which includes reference to 
service institutions for minorities run according to 
principles of self-management.41            
  A more detailed blueprint for how non-
territorially based minority institutions might take 
shape was subsequently provided by Ukraine’s 
Law ‘On the cooperation of territorial 
communities’, adopted in June 2014. Catering 
both for newly established capable territorial 
communities and those existing local authorities as 
yet still outside the new framework, the law 
defines cooperation as ‘the relations between two 
or more territorial communities, regulated by 
agreement, and implemented through one of the 
forms defined by this law for the purpose of 
providing social-economic, cultural development 
of territories, improvement of quality of services 
for the population based on common interests and 
aims, effective execution of mandate of local self-
governance bodies’.42 Cooperation may take the 
form of delegation of tasks and resources for their 
implementation, realization of common projects, 
joint establishment and financing of communal 
institutions, and establishment of the joint bodies 
for the implementation of a mandate defined by 
the law. The state can support cooperation of 
territorial communities by providing subsidies, 
transferring objects from state to communal 
ownership, or through methodological, 
organizational and other support. At the same 
time, cooperation may be financed from local 
budgets, self-taxation and a state budget, 
international technical aid, credits, etc.43 
  This law therefore offers the possibility 
for new territorial communities in the Hungarian 
area of settlement to work together autonomously 
in order to establish their own institutions in the 
field of education management, including schools 
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catering specifically for the needs of the 
community as a national minority. Beyond the 
specific case of Hungarians in Zakarpattya 
referenced here, the possibility to establish 
coordinating minority institutions at local level 
might prove equally if not more useful in terms of 
addressing the needs of numerically smaller and 
more territorially dispersed minorities, which are 
less obviously catered for within the current 
process of decentralization.  
  At the time of writing, however, there are 
no examples of successful cooperation among 
territorial communities in this sphere, either in 
Zakarpattya or in the rest of the country.44 This 
might be explained by a general lack of 
information about the law, coupled with a low 
level of professionalism of public officials on the 
local level on the one hand, and by limited state 
incentives to stimulate this process, on the other. 
For example, the education subsidy provided by 
the state could not be used for these purposes. 
Moreover, only those amalgamated territorial 
communities that were established under a 
Perspective Plan are entitled receive this subsidy.45  
  A further factor may be a more 
generalised uncertainty with regard to future 
development of minority rights provisions. 
Reform processes in the sphere of education, for 
instance, are still at an early stage, which means 
that there might yet be space to elaborate and 
implement alternative practices in those areas 
where national minorities reside compactly. 
Ukrainian policymakers have also declared their 
intention to come up with a clearer definition of 
national-cultural autonomy, which is listed as a 
right under point 6 of Ukraine’s 1992 Law on 
National Minorities. Until now, this law has 
served as little more than a declaratory framework, 
and further thought should clearly be given on 
how to develop its provisions within the overall 
context of Ukraine’s current territorial 
administrative reform.  
  Ukraine’s current geostrategic and 
political situation, however, means that minority 
rights issues (including reform of the language 
law) have either been accorded low priority or 
have been deemed too sensitive to address openly 
through public debate.  For instance, Ukraine’s 
former Government Commissioner for 
Ethnonational Policy National Minorities 
Gennadiy Druzenko – while declaring ‘Unity in 
Diversity’ as the overall guiding vision for the 
post-Euromaidan Ukrainian state – expressed 
skepticism towards the concept of national-
cultural autonomy, which he seemed to equate 
with national-territorial autonomy.46 Precedents 
from elsewhere demonstrate that non-territorial 
modalities of self-government or self-management 
can in fact be combined with (non-ethnically 
based) regional devolution and appropriate 
arrangements for political representation in a way 
that addresses the needs even of territorially 
compact national minority communities.47 Indeed, 
a Hungarian autonomy concept along these lines 
(the so-called ‘Gulácsi Draft’) has previously been 
prepared by KMKSZ, while a further draft law 
based on the non-territorial principle was also 
submitted to parliament in 2005 by István Gajdos, 
president of UMDSZ, only to be rejected by the 
relevant parliamentary committee.48 In an 
environment where national minority issues 
remain highly securitized, however, the very term 
‘autonomy’ has become highly sensitive and 
problematic. In other words, to borrow a phrase 
used by Marguerite Marlin, it has become ‘less 
significant for the character of constitutional 
reforms than it is as a political signifier’.49   
  Specific issues of cultural autonomy, 
 ECMI- Working Paper # 95 
 
14 | P a g e  
 
moreover, must be seen within the context of the 
other commitments made under the 2014 
Brenzovics-Poroshenko agreement and whether 
these will be delivered upon in full.  As already 
noted, there is still no clarity as to how existing 
provisions for local use of minority languages 
might develop. Furthermore, the formulation of 
the agreement was rather broad and did not 
specify, for example, how exactly Hungarian 
minority representation in the parliament would be 
ensured. Ahead of the 2014 parliamentary 
elections, KMKSZ again appealed (without 
success) for a revision of electoral boundaries in 
Zakarpattya that would also for the creation of a 
‘Hungarian district’. Ultimately, Lazslo 
Brenzovics was able to secure election to 
parliament after President Poroshenko offered him 
a place on the list of his own political party, in 
what amounted to a continuation of the state of 
affairs that had existed prior to the Euromaidan 
Revolution.50 In the immediate term, though, 
Brenzovics’ election to parliament - and 
membership of the Verhovna Rada subcommittee 
on Human Rights, National Minorities and 
International Relations  - gives at least some voice 
to Hungarians in state-level decision-making 
processes. At the same time, it also increases the 
potential for bridge-building between Kyiv and 
Budapest, given that KMKSZ is affiliated with the 
Hungary’s ruling Fidesz Party.51    
  The Hungarian minority fared somewhat 
better in terms of representation when it came to 
the local elections held in Zakarpattya in October-
November 2015. A law adopted by the Ukrainian 
parliament in July 2015 contained a clause 
ensuring contiguity of electoral districts, while 
setting a 5% threshold for parties and 7% for 
blocs.52 In each of the four districts established 
that cover the area where the Hungarian minority 
lives compactly, ethnic Hungarians constituted the 
majority of voters, thus ensuring the possibility of 
Hungarian representation within local self-
government bodies. The provision on thresholds, 
meanwhile, stimulated cooperation between the 
two Hungarian political parties, which resulted in 
the largest number of Hungarian representatives to 
the regional council since 2002. At the same time, 
the adoption of new law highlighted the continued 
absence of legislative mechanisms securing 
minority representation at all levels, with KMKSZ 
and UMDSZ complaining that the Central 
Electoral Commission did not take sufficient 
account of the ‘contiguity’ provision with regard 
to some districts of the districts compactly 
populated by Hungarians.53 Similar claims were 
made by the authorities in Hungary, where the 
Fidesz-led government has repeatedly expressed 
its concern over changes to electoral legislation 
while lobbying for the re-establishment of a 
‘Hungarian’ electoral district. Predictably, the 
issue of the Hungarian minority has also been 
referred to by officials in Russia, as part of their 
regular pronouncements on the situation in 
Ukraine.54  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Although existing Ukrainian legislation contains 
mechanisms for preserving the country’s ethnic 
diversity, its administrative–territorial division 
remains ‘ethnically neutral’. Current processes of 
reform, driven by the pressing need to promote 
economic revitalization and effective and 
sustainable local government, do not explicitly 
link administrative, budgetary or territorial 
changes to the country’s ethnic composition. The 
main focus of the reform is to strengthen united 
territorial communities (henceforth the country’s 
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smallest administrative-territorial units) by 
providing them with more responsibilities and 
resources.  
 The reform process has again brought into 
focus questions related to the accommodation of 
ethno-cultural diversity, especially with regard to 
the Hungarian minority living compactly in 
western Zarkapattya. As the post-Euromaidan 
government has acknowledged through its 
declared policy of building ‘unity in diversity’, 
accommodating claims articulated in the name of 
minority communities is crucially important to the 
current project of consolidating Ukraine as a 
democratic political community. The revived 
claim for national-territorial autonomy presented 
by Hungarian activists in December 2015, 
however, appears problematic both practically and 
politically, and does not appear to be a feasible 
option at the present time.   
  Instead, this paper has proposed that a 
compromise position be sought between the 
‘ethnically neutral’ state conception and the ethno-
territorial paradigm advanced by Hungarian 
actors. In the first instance, this would entail 
ensuring that the boundaries of new capable 
territorial communities created in the region are 
drawn in a way that safeguards as far as possible 
existing provisions for use of the Hungarian 
language within the region. Closely linked to this 
is the question of representation: in order to ensure 
proper execution of the responsibilities envisaged 
by the reform, the Hungarian minority should be 
provided with legal safeguards of its 
representation in local, regional and national 
government bodies, through the drawing of stable 
contiguous boundaries of electoral districts 
reflecting the settlement patterns of ethnic 
Hungarians. Finally, this paper has highlighted 
some form of non-territorial autonomy as a 
promising additional avenue that could be 
explored within the context of current discussions. 
Such an approach would speak meaningfully to 
the concept of national-cultural autonomy 
included in Ukraine’s 1992 Law on National 
Minorities, and has also formed part of the 
platform advanced by Hungarian parties and 
organizations within Zakarpattya over the past 20 
years. Furthermore (and as a basis for a separate, 
wider discussion), this paper has suggested that 
elements of NTA might be usefully applied to 
meet the requirements of numerically smaller and 
more territorially dispersed minority communities 
within Ukraine, the position of which is less 
obviously catered for within the current process of 
administrative-territorial reform. 
  The agreement struck in 2014 between 
Petro Poroshenko and KMKSZ seemingly set out 
a blueprint for accommodation of the Hungarian 
minority that is broadly consistent with the one 
sketched out here above. However, it is too early 
to say whether the objectives outlined in the 
agreement will be delivered upon in full. Whilst 
fully acknowledging the scale of the challenge 
inherent in trying to build such arrangements in 
the current securitised political context, Hungarian 
claims in Zakarpattya should not in themselves be 
seen as threatening further the territorial integrity 
of Ukraine. Rather, democratic accommodation of 
ethno-cultural diversity in the region could be seen 
as something likely to boost the longer-term 
consolidation of Ukrainian society. In this regard, 
one should not overlook the importance of 
continued constructive engagement in this area by 
the Council of Europe and OSCE as well as the 
European Union and its member states, notably (in 
this particular case) Hungary, where recent policy 
has often seemed more driven by 
instrumentalisation of Hungarian minorities 
 ECMI- Working Paper # 95 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
abroad for domestic political purposes than it has 
by a genuine interest in promoting a more durable 
accommodation between these minorities and their 
states of residence.  
 A further issue brought to light by this 
article is the extent to which questions of 
autonomy (and security) continue to be 
instrumentalised by Ukrainian elites as part of a 
competition for power at both regional and central 
level, as can be seen in the current struggle in 
Zakarpattya between Poroshenko and Baloha. This 
translates into efforts by the ruling Ukrainian 
parties to co-opt spokespersons for national 
minorities, who in turn seek to play off different 
sides against one other in an effort to maximize 
their own position and interests. Sustainable 
accommodation of diversity in the longer term 
therefore becomes a matter not just of 
desecuritization, but of further democratization.  
  In this respect, scholars and practitioners 
working in the area of ethnic diversity 
accommodation stress the importance of 
encouraging minority participation in decision-
making via regular dialogue with and consultation 
of spokespersons for particular communities. In 
recent times, numerous commentators have called 
upon the Ukrainian government to set up 
roundtables or other consultative bodies that 
would provide an additional mechanism for 
minority spokespersons to voice concerns and 
perspectives alongside their participation in 
elected state bodies. Here the Mejlis / Qurultay of 
the Crimean Tatars might offer an instructive 
precedent, as a body elected according to NTA 
principles that has evolved into a recognised 
representative body of the Crimean Tatars. Recent 
discussions within Ukraine suggest that the 
Crimean Tatars – given their current 
circumstances – are still considered to be an 
exceptional case and the state is – perhaps 
understandably –wary at the present time of 
introducing a general law providing for elected 
NTA bodies, of the kind adopted by Serbia, 
Hungary and other states in the region. Be that as 
it may, the introduction of a consultative body 
giving voice to minority NGOs could be seen as a 
positive step in terms of building trust between 
different communities and strengthening 
Ukraine’s ‘unity in diversity’.  
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Notes 
                                                     
1 Working Paper for the ESRC IAA project ‘Building Unity in Diversity in Ukraine: The Potential for Non-Territorial 
Cultural Autonomy as an Institutional Framework’. The work for this paper was supported by an Economic and Social 
Research Council Impact Acceleration Account award [Grant Number ES/M500471/1]. 
2 Salnykova 2014: 90. 
3 In this regard, see: Galbreath & McEvoy 2012; Mylonas 2012; Dembinska et al 2014. 
4 Marlin 2016: 289-290. 
5 Authors commonly distinguish between ‘security’ and ‘normative’ approaches when discussing states’ strategies 
for the political management of ethnic diversity. The former seeks to control non-dominant groups with the 
instrumental aim of securing the territorial integrity of the state, while the latter (based in liberal democratic theory) 
seeks to accommodate these groups because their cultures are assigned intrinsic value and are seen as enriching the 
life of the state. The two approaches have, however, been seen as interdependent – i.e. devolution in good faith is 
seen as the best way of building mutual trust and strengthening the security and integrity of the state (see Malloy 
(2015: 6), citing Weller &Wolff 2005: 13; also Smith & Hiden 2012, Gross 2014). The latter view was advanced in 
July 2015 by Deputy of the Ukrainian Verhovna Rada (Parliament) Laszlo Brenzovics (discussed later in this paper), 
who observed ‘historical experience shows that repressing linguistic, cultural, representative and other rights and 
opportunities for minorities can become a destabilizing factor. Conversely, improving the health of groups of people 
dramatically reduces centrifugal aspirations […] It is necessary to prudently use European techniques on the rights 
of national minorities that have already given good results for decades’. Cited in Marlin 2016: 283.  
6 Citation from brochure for ‘Conference On Non-Territorial National-Cultural Self-Government: Ukrainian 
Perspective, Organised by the European Centre for Minority Issues within the framework of the Eastern Partnership 
Programme: National Minorities and Ethno-Cultural Issues. Belarus-Moldova-Ukraine. Co-Organizers: Kuras 
Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; School of Social and 
Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. 2-3 June 2016, Kuras Institute, Kyiv, Ukraine’. See: Events 
Announcements: The conference “Non-Territorial National-Cultural Self-Government: Ukrainian Perspective” 
http://www.ipiend.gov.ua/?mid=17&action=events_detail&event_id=20 (accessed 19 September 2016). 
7 On this tension, see Dembinska et al (2014: 356). The term ‘community of persons’ derives from the concept of 
non-territorial autonomy first propounded by the socialist politicians Karl Renner and Otto Bauer in early 20 th-
century Austria. According to this principle, citizens have the right to freely determine their ethnicity and enrol on a 
separate state-wide national register of electors used to elect bodies of cultural self-government with a remit 
extending to the state territory as a whole. The right to cultural autonomy can thereby be exercised by individuals 
irrespective of where they reside within the given state. Variants of this approach have been implemented in a range 
of contexts over the past 100 years, including inter-war Estonia and and present-day Hungary and Serbia. See: Bauer 
2000, Coakley 1994, Smith & Cordell 2008, Smith 2013, Coakley 2016, Smith 2016.  
8 Marlin 2016. 
9 See Malloy’s introduction and the range of case studies discussed in Malloy, Osipov and Vizi 2015. 
10 These arrangements are currently being investigated at the University of Glasgow as part of the Economic and 
Social Research Council grant ‘National Minority Rights and Democratic Political Community: Practices of Non-
Territorial Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe’ [2014-17; grant number 
ES/L007126/1].  
11 Hitherto, Ukraine was divided into 24 oblasts (regions), the autonomous republic of Crimea and two ‘cities with 
special status’ – Kyiv and Sevastopol 
12 The two exceptions are Zakarpattya, where the Regional Council has delayed approval of the plan, and Crimea, 
where Russian occupation has ruled out any implementation of the decentralization reform. 
13 The nature of the process means that even one village may block a decision of a majority of villages/towns willing 
to unite. 
14 According to Yuriy Hanuschak, one of the initiators of this draft law, the capable united community, envisaged in 
the Plan, will be counted as created only if a majority of village/town councils decide to unite. This will enable the 
process of allocation of funds to the united community. Those which decided to abstain will have to join the capable 
community using a by-election process. Hanyschak, Y., ‘The draft law preventing formation of territorial 
communities, which do not correspond with the Perspective Plan, is being prepared’, 
http://decentralization.gov.ua/news/item/id/1338, 11 January 2016.  According to the changes proposed by draft law 
#3390, regional councils are excluded from the process of Perspective plans’ adoption if within one month after 
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submission of the Plan they do not review it. Parliament of Ukraine, Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On amending the law of 
Ukraine ‘On Voluntary Unification of territorial communities’: http://www.rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/124354.html, 
2 February 2016. This law has yet to pass its second reading in the parliament. If adopted, these draft laws will 
strengthen the role of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Profile Ministry in determining the pace of decentralization 
reform. 
15 Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On the Voluntary Unification of territorial communities’: 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/157-19, 5 February 2015. This approach is consistent with pre-existing 
legislation in Ukraine, which delegates the majority of responsibilities in this area to local self-government bodies - 
for example, decisions as to whether particular regional or national minority languages are taught in schools or can 
be used in communication with local authorities. See: Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On the National 
Minorities in Ukraine’ http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12, 25 June 1992; Parliament of Ukraine, Law of 
Ukraine ‘On the basics of Ukraine’s state language policy’ http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17, 3 July 
2012.  
16 The Government defines a capable community as one that is able to ‘provide (directly or through local self-
government bodies) a proper level of services in the sphere of education, culture, healthcare, social security and 
communal property taking into account its cadre and financial resources and infrastructure development of 
subsequent administrative-territorial unit’. Cabinet of Ministers, ‘On adoption of the Methodology of capable 
territorial communities’ formation’: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/214-2015-%D0%BF, 5 April 2015. 
17 Reference from State Statistical Committee of Ukraine. 
18 http://stat.testportal.com.ua/ 
19 Prior to 2005, KMKSZ existed as an NGO.  
20 On September 5, the head of KMKSZ László Brenzovics and the head of UMDSZ László Zybanych signed the 
agreement, which envisaged ‘a constructive cooperation in the interest of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattya’. 
The political parties decided to establish a coordination committee to align their activities before and during 
elections. 
http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?dlya_uchasti_u_mistsevih_viborah_na_zakarpatti_obyednalisya_dvi_ugorski_p
artiyi&objectId=1364493, 6 September 2015. 
21 Kruhlashov, 2014:78. 
22 Ibid. 
23 http://mukachevo.today/news/suspilstvo/na_zakarpatti_hochut_stvoriti_okremij_ugorskij_rajon_114_poselen_-
_za, 13 December 2015. Berehovo was named as the centre of the district. 
24 Regional Offices of Reforms were established in 24 regions in order to facilitate the decentralization process in 
the country. They were supported by the USAID programme, and were not registered as legal entities. In 2016, the 
Ministry of Regional Development announced the establishment of new institutions which would have a wider 
mandate and would be registered de jure and work in the same field. The coordinators for these institutions have 
already been selected. 
25 Zakarpattya Regional State Administration, http://www.carpathia.gov.ua/ua/publication/content/12752.htm, 15 
December 2015. 
26 Beregovo Today, http://beregovo.today/NewsOpen/id_news_251226, 21 December 2015.  
27 The PPB is the bloc of the current President of Ukraine, who appointed Moskal as Governor in July 2015. PPB 
won the largest number of seats in the October 2014 elections to the Ukrainian parliament and forms part of the 
ruling coalition government. In the Zakarpattya regional elections, however, it gained only 15 seats out of 64. Even 
after reaching an agreement with the two Hungarian parties KMKSZ+UDMKZ, however, Moskal cannot command 
a stable majority within the regional council, and is forced to rely on situational arrangements with other factions. 
Still highly influential in the region is the former Governor, local oligarch and politician Viktor Baloha, whose party 
‘United Centre’ has its stronghold in Zakarpattya and 19 seats in the regional council. Baloha is currently at odds 
with the Presidential Party, having opposed Moskal’s nomination, and is keen to ensure that any process of reform 
does not affect his business interests and influence within the region. This conflict disrupts the work of the regional 
council and partly accounts for its failure to approve the ‘perspective plan’ on administrative-territorial reform 
prepared by the regional administration.  
28 Dembinska et al 2014 
29 In this regard, Francesco Palermo (2015) distinguishes between giving autonomy to a region (and its inhabitants), 
and giving territorial autonomy (with implicit ‘ownership’ rights) to an ethnic group.  
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30 Beregszasz News, 2014. Beregszasz News, 2014: http://beregszasz.com.ua/index.php/politika-br-polityka/7812-
yobbik-i-dali-aktyvno-vystupaie-za-pryiednannia-zakarpattia-do-uhorshchyny. 
31 News.Liga.Net, http://news.liga.net/news/politics/1720632-
premer_vengrii_potreboval_avtonomii_dlya_vengrov_zakarpatya_.htm, 13 May 2014. This article mentions the 
official Budapest position towards Hungarians living in Zakarpattya: autonomy, dual citizenship and national 
minority rights.  
32 This was signed by Ukraine in 1992, ratified in 2003, and entered into force in 2006. 
33 Moser 2014 
34 Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Third periodical report presented to 
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 15 of the Charter: Ukraine, 12 January 
2016. http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/report/PeriodicalReports/UkrainePR3_en.pdf.   
35 Article 7.2 of the 1997 Law on Elections stated that ‘localities, where national minority lives compactly, shall not 
exceed borders of one electoral district. In those cases, when a number of electors belonging to the national minority 
exceeds the number of electors necessary for formation of electoral district, districts are formed in a way that at least 
in one of them electors representing national minority constitute the majority of electors in the district’. Parliament 
of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine’: 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/541/97-%D0%B2%D1%80, 24 September 1997. 
36 Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/WP023?PT001F01=900&PID100=21; Kruhlashov, 2014: 83. 
37 Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine’, 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2766-14, 18 October 2001; Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On 
elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine’, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1665-15, 25 March 2004; 
Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On amending the law of Ukraine ‘On elections of People’s Deputies of 
Ukraine’, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2777-15, 7 July 2005. 
38 The same was true of the leader of the Romanian minority in Сhernivtsi region Ivan Popesku, who was ranked 
73rd.  
39Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On amending certain legislative acts aimed at improvement of electoral 
legislation’, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/709-18/paran33#n33, 23 November 2013. 
40 Karpatskyi Objective, http://karpatskijobjektiv.com/petro-poroshenko-pobuvav-na-zakarpatt/, 5 May 2014. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On the cooperation of territorial communities’, 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1508-18#n23, 17 June 2014. 
43 Ibid. The latter provision appears to open up the possibility of receiving external financial support for Hungarian 
minority development from neighbouring Hungary.  
44 Ministry of Regional Development of Ukraine, ‘The registry of cooperation among territorial communities’: 
http://www.minregion.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Reestr-01.08.16.pdf, 1 August 2016.  
45 Parliament of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine ‘On amending the Budget Code of Ukraine concerning the reform of 
interbudgetary relations’, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/79-19/page3, 28 December 2014. 
46 http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2014/12/141230_ru_s_druzenko_interview. Druzenko was in 
post during 2014-15, but has since been dismissed and his post abolished, suggesting that this is not a current 
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